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Evidence from a Field Experiment in France
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Anti-Muslim prejudice is widespread in Western countries. Yet, Muslims are expected to 
constitute a growing share of the total population in Western countries over the next decades. 
This paper predicts that this demographic trend will increase anti-Muslim prejudice. Relying 
on experimental games and a formal model, we show that the generosity of rooted French 
toward Muslims is significantly decreased with the increase of Muslims in their midst, and 
demonstrate that these results are driven by the activation of rooted French taste-based 
discrimination against Muslims when Muslim numbers increase. Our findings call for solutions 
to anti-Muslim prejudice in the West. 
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that’s ok; it’s when there’s a lot
of them that there are problems.
Brice Hortefeux, Former French
Minister of Interior.i
1 Introduction
On January 20, 2011, Baroness Sayeed Warsi, the ﬁrst Muslim woman to serve in the British
cabinet, argued that prejudice against Muslims is seen by many people in the UK as nor-
mal and uncontroversial, and that “Islamophobia has now passed the dinner table test.”1
Distressingly, anti-Muslim prejudice is not speciﬁc to the UK. Despite their virtually com-
plete secularization in the past century, European states, all of them with historic Christian
majorities, are considered as having a special problem with Islam going back to the fall
of Constantinople to the Ottomans and the reconquest of Spain in the 15th century. The
post-WWII immigration wave that has laid the foundation for today’s European Muslim
population, has further exacerbated this prejudice. In recent years, a chain of international
events has led to ever increasing attention to Islam and Muslims in public discussion not
only in Europe, but also in the US.
The impact of September 11 seems decisive. In the US, Davila and Mora (2005) and
Kaushal, Kaestner, and Reimers (2007) ﬁnd that, subsequent to that attack, Middle Eastern
Arabs (and Afghan, Iranian, and Pakistani men in particular) experienced a signiﬁcant
decline in earnings. To be sure, even before September 11, prejudice against Muslims was
more widespread than prejudice against other immigrants in Western and Eastern Europe,
as documented by Strabac and Listhaug (2008). However, Allen and Nielsen (2002), Fetzer
iThis remark was uttered in French during a photo-op on September 5, 2009 at the UMP Sum-
mer School in Seignosse, in which the Minister was interacting with a young militant, Hamid. Brice
Hortefeux joked before the statement in the epigraph that this militant, who was known to be Mus-
lim, “does not correspond at all to the prototype” after having been told that the militant eats
pork and drinks beer. The video of this interaction, procured by Le Monde, was uploaded at
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xafz5w_le-derapage-de-brice-hortefeux-la-h, and we down-
loaded it on September 24, 2010. Translated from the French by the authors.
1This remark was uttered at the University of Leicester. Excerpts from the speech are available
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/worldhaveyoursay/2011/01/has_prejudice_against_muslims.html.
We accessed this website on September 1, 2011.
1and Soper (2003) and Sheridan and Gillet (2005) show that this hostility against Muslim
communities increased in the aftermath of September 11 in a wide range of EU countries.
Despite this context of widespread anti-Muslim prejudice, Muslim populations are ex-
pected to constitute a growing share of the total population in Western countries over the
next decades, through continued migration and higher-than-average fertility rates among
Muslims. According to the Pew Research Center (2011), the Muslim share of the popula-
tion in Europe as a whole is expected to grow by nearly one-third over the next 20 years,
rising from 6% of the region’s inhabitants in 2010 to 8% in 2030. In the US, also reported
by Pew, the population projections show the number of Muslims more than doubling over
the next two decades, leading the US to host a larger number of Muslims by 2030 than all
European countries save for Russia and France. Given these demographic trends, how will
anti-Muslim prejudice evolve? For instance, will rooted Westerners be more or less generous
toward Muslims as Muslim numbers around them increase (what we call Muslim out-group
salience)?
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we want to understand how anti-Muslim
prejudice in Western countries will evolve with Muslim out-group salience over the next
decades. To do so, we rely on experimental games that we conducted in France in 2009. Our
games bring together rooted French (the so-called “Fran¸ cais de souche” which we abbreviate
as FdS hereafter)2 and a set of immigrants.3 These immigrants belong to two ethno-linguistic
groups in Senegal, the Joolas and the Serers that are divided by religion, with one portion
of them being Muslim and another portion being Christian. With the exception of religion,
Senegalese Muslims (hereafter SM) and Senegalese Christians (hereafter SX) from these two
ethno-linguistic groups are similar. They share the same culture and migrated to France in
the same time period.4 The goal of this experiment is to compare the eﬀect of SM out-group
salience on rooted French generosity toward SM with the eﬀect of SX out-group salience
on rooted French generosity toward SX. To achieve this goal, we organize a dictator game,5
2By rooted French or FdS, we refer to French citizens with four grandparents born inside metropolitan
France. We identify this set in order to maximally diﬀerentiate French citizens with no immigrant background
(FdS) from those of recent migration to France (SM and SX).
3In France, the term “immigrants” refers only to those permanently and legally residing in France who
were born abroad. In this paper, we use the term much more broadly, viz., to refer to all residents in France
who are immigrants from outside the EU, who moved to France after World War II, and their descendants.
4See Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2010) for full justiﬁcation of this identiﬁcation strategy.
5The dictator game was introduced by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986). It is a two-person game
in which player 1, called the “donor”, has to decide what share s 2 [0;1] of an amount of money normalized
to 1 he gives to player 2, called the “recipient”. For a given share s, the monetary payoﬀ of player 1 and of
player 2 is given by x1 = 1   s and x2 = s respectively.
2played communally, and vary exogenously the ethno-religious composition of the player-set
across the game sessions by manipulating the number of SM and SX in each game session.
We then compare the impact of increasing numbers of SM players on the amount given
by rooted French donors to SM recipients, with the impact of increasing numbers of SX
players on the amount given by rooted French donors to SX recipients. Our results reveal
that FdS generosity toward SM is signiﬁcantly decreased with SM out-group salience, in a
way that is not matched by the impact of SX out-group salience on FdS generosity toward
SX. We portray this result as the Hortefeux eﬀect (see the epigraph) to the extent that the
presence of one additional SM is enough to undermine FdS generosity toward SM recipients.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that FdS correctly believe that the impact of SM out-group salience on
FdS generosity toward SM recipients is signiﬁcantly more negative than the impact of SX
out-group salience on FdS generosity toward SX recipients. This ﬁnding suggests that the
appearance of FdS discriminatory behavior toward Muslims with increasing Muslim out-
group salience is common knowledge among rooted French, such that Brice Hortefeux, the
former French Minister of Interior, can refer to the negative consequences of Muslim out-
group salience in an unguarded way.
What accounts for the decrease in FdS generosity toward Muslims following Muslim out-
group salience? Understanding the mechanism underlying the Hortefeux eﬀect constitutes
the second objective of this paper.6 To do so, we develop a rational model augmented with
other-regarding preferences that experimental economists have shown to be key determinants
of individual behavior.7 This model oﬀers two possible explanations for the Hortefeux eﬀect.
First, the decrease in FdS generosity toward Muslims when Muslim numbers increase may
be a response to changes in the behavior of non-FdS when Muslim numbers increase. For
instance, FdS can be less generous toward Muslims with Muslim out-group salience if, in that
context, Muslims are more generous toward each other and/or if Muslims are less generous
toward FdS. In the former case, FdS will free-ride on Muslims’ in-group generosity. In the
latter case, FdS will compensate members of their in-group for Muslims’ lower generosity
toward FdS, thereby lowering their generosity toward Muslims. Second, the decrease in
6Samuelson (2005) recommends exploiting experimental results in order to improve our understanding
of the mechanisms underlying individuals’ behavior, thereby allowing the development of theories yielding
higher predictive power.
7In experimental economics, the dictator game provides compelling evidence for other-regarding prefer-
ences challenging the homo oeconomicus postulate, which predicts that the donor should not give anything
of his initial endowment to the recipient. Indeed, Forsythe, Horowitz and Sefton (1994) show that 80%
of their subjects choose to give a strictly positive share of their initial endowment, with 20% choosing to
divide this endowment equally. Reviewing eleven results from dictator games, Camerer (2003) reveals the
generality of this ﬁnding, as the mean oﬀer ranges from 10% to 52%.
3FdS generosity toward Muslims when Muslim numbers increase may result from changes in
FdS preferences and notably from the activation of FdS taste-based discrimination against
Muslims when FdS are surrounded by Muslims. In that context, the positive weight that FdS
assign to the well-being of Muslims is a decreasing function of the relative size of the Muslim
minority. Our results show that FdS are the only donors in the dictator game to change
their donations when Muslim numbers increase. Notably, SM donors do not change their
donations with Muslim out-group salience. This suggests that the Hortefeux eﬀect derives
from an activation of FdS distaste toward Muslims with Muslim out-group salience. This
ﬁnding is in line with Schneider (2008) who shows, based on the European Social Survey,
that the perception by Europeans of a symbolic, rather than actual threat, accounts for
the increase in Europeans’ anti-immigrant attitudes when the relative size of the immigrant
community increases. These results have ominous societal implications and point to the
urgency of ﬁnding solutions to taste-based discrimination against Muslims.
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature on discrimination. The ﬁrst strand
theorizes the mechanisms linking attitudes toward the out-group and out-group relative size.
Two theories oppose each other. Intergroup contact theory predicts that an increase in the
relative size of the minority provides contact opportunities with the minority, which in turn
attenuate prejudice by the dominant group against members of the minority (Allport (1954)).
Group threat theory predicts that an increase in the relative size of the minority generates
hostile attitudes by the dominant group toward the minority, either because of increased com-
petition over tangible scarce resources or because of the perception by the dominant group of
a symbolic threat (which we call “distaste”) to one’s cultural integrity (Blalock (1967)). This
paper allows us to test intergroup contact theory against group threat theory. By increasing
the number of Muslims in the game sessions, we give an opportunity for both theories to
shape individual behavior: an increase in the number of Muslims increases opportunities for
interaction and contact; but it also introduces the prospect of a Muslim threat. If contact
theory dominates, we should observe a decrease in FdS taste-based discrimination toward
Muslims. If group threat theory dominates, we should observe an increase instead. Our
ﬁndings show that the latter wins out: the behavior we observe toward the Muslim minority
is consistent with group threat theory rather than intergroup contact theory. Moreover, this
paper identiﬁes the mechanism behind group threat theory: the perception by the dominant
group of a symbolic threat, not actual threatening behavior by the minority, accounts for
the hostile behavior by the dominant group against that minority.
4The second strand puts these theoretical mechanisms to test. Several scholars have found
this relationship to be statistically insigniﬁcant.8 Yet, others identify a signiﬁcant relation-
ship that generally points to an increase in negative attitudes toward the out-group when
the out-group becomes more salient.9 Few studies have analyzed the relationship between
Muslim out-group salience and anti-Muslim prejudice. Those that do also point to an in-
crease in anti-Muslim prejudice in geographic areas where Muslim out-group size is higher.
Bowyer (2009) shows that residential proximity in the UK to Pakistanis and Bangladeshis,
who are primarily Muslim, is associated with more negative attitudes towards ethnic mi-
norities. Similarly, relying on survey data, Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma and Hagendoorn
(2010) ﬁnd that Muslim out-group size is related to anti-Muslim attitudes by rooted Dutch.
We complement these approaches in a number of ways. By comparing changes in attitudes
of Westerners toward Muslim immigrants when the relative size of the Muslim immigrant
group increases, with changes in attitudes of Westerners toward a control group when the
relative size of this control group increases (this control group diﬀering only from Muslim
immigrants with respect to religion), we isolate a Muslim eﬀect from possible confounds
such as race, ethnicity, or nationality. By relying on experimental games bringing together
FdS, SM, and SX, we improve upon previous survey-based studies10 with an analysis that
looks directly at discriminatory behaviors. By exogenously varying the ethno-religious com-
position of the player-set across the game sessions, we overcome the simultaneity bias that
typically11 contaminates studies investigating the relationship between demographic context
and attitudes toward migrants: racially intolerant individuals from the majority community
are indeed unlikely to choose to live in areas with large ethnic minority populations.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our experimental setup. In
Section 3, we present our experimental results, including the Hortefeux eﬀect. In Section
4, we develop a rational model augmented with other-regarding preferences to explain the
behavior of FdS donors in the dictator game. We then run an empirical test showing that
the Hortefeux eﬀect derives from an activation of rooted French taste-based discrimination
8See Strabac and Listhaug (2008) for Europe; Hjerm (2007) for Sweden; Citrin and Sides (2008) for
Europe and the US.
9See Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders (2002), Schneider (2008), Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009) for
Europe; Dustmann and Preston (2001) for the UK; Krueger and Pischke (1997) for Germany; Schlueter,
Schmidt and Wagner (2008) for Germany and Russia; Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) for the Netherlands;
Taylor (1998) for the US.
10The previous studies are all based on self-reported attitudinal measures, with the exception of Krueger
and Pischke (1997) who analyze the relationship between crime against foreigners and the relative number
of foreigners.
11Dustmann and Preston (2001) and Hopkins (2010) are an exception.
5against Muslims with Muslim out-group salience. Section 5 provides robustness checks. Sec-
tion 6 summarizes our major conclusions and discusses their implications for the integration
of Muslim immigrants into Western societies.
2 Experimental set up
In this section, we present our subject pool, our treatment (i.e.: the variation of the ethno-
religious composition of the player-sets across the game sessions) and the dictator game that
allows us to analyze the impact of Muslim out-group salience on rooted French generosity.12
2.1 The subject pool
In March 2009, we set up a series of experimental games between FdS, SM and SX. We
recruited 27 Senegalese players: 16 self-identiﬁed as Muslims (SM) and 11 as Christians
(SX).13 We relied upon three separate networks to recruit these Senegalese players. Two
of the networks came from the ethnographers who were conducting family histories for our
wider research project, and were asked to recruit subjects by merely telling them they had
heard about experiments with a chance to earn a lot of money. No mention was to be made
about Senegalese speciﬁcity or religion. The third network came from a Senegalese night
watchman (not from the Joola or Serer communities) who worked at a student dorm. He
was given a quota for the SM and SX and paid for each recruit who showed up for inscription
and participated in the games. Here again, no mention was to be made about Senegalese
speciﬁcity or religion.
It is important to note that African Muslims are less spontaneously associated with Is-
lam in the French collective imagination because they know little to no Arabic and interact
indiscriminately with African Muslims and African non-Muslims (Diop (1988)). Any evi-
dence of FdS discrimination against SM should thus be interpreted as a lower bound on the
magnitude of FdS anti-Muslim discrimination: levels of discrimination against Maghrebis,
the Muslims who are at the center of public debates about the role of Islam in France, would
almost certainly be higher (had there been a way to identify a Muslim eﬀect from a Maghrebi
12Full protocols (in French, but with English translations) are available upon request. Here we review only
what is necessary for interpreting the results presented in the subsequent section. We take this opportunity
to thank our six recruiters and monitors for their incredible hard work, intellectual contributions throughout,
and dedication to the project: Mathieu Couttenier, Jacinto Cuvi Escobar, Karine Marazyan, Etienne Smith,
Josselin Thuilliez and Severine Toussaert.
13Our subjects are coded by religious self-identiﬁcation or ascribed religious heritage.
6immigrant sample in France) than those we ﬁnd for Senegalese Muslims.
To complement our game sessions, we also recruited 52 non Senegalese players. The
ethno-religious breakdown of these 52 non-Senegalese players was as follows. First, 29 play-
ers, among whom 21 FdS, were of European background. We categorize all these 29 players
as being of Judeo-Christian background. The 19 players who speciﬁed their religion con-
ﬁrmed that they were either Christian (18 players) or Jewish (1 player), while the others (who
self-declared as “atheist” or who didn’t specify a religious belonging) all had recognizable
Judeo-Christian ﬁrst names: Bertrand, Dani` ele, Fabien, Florence, Karl, Marine, R´ enald,
Sophie, Spyro, Yves. Second, 12 players were of African background. We categorize 6 of
these 12 players as being of Judeo-Christian background. The 5 players among them who
speciﬁed their religion conﬁrmed that they were Christians, while the remaining player (who
didn’t specify a religious belonging) had a recognizable Judeo-Christian ﬁrst name: Julie.
We categorize the other 6 African players as being of Muslim background. The 4 players
among them who speciﬁed their religion conﬁrmed that they were Muslims. As for the 2
players who didn’t specify a religious belonging, one of them was known by our ethnogra-
phers to stem from a Muslim family while the other had a recognizable Muslim (Arabic)
name: Ma¨ ımouna. Finally, 12 players were of North African background. We categorize
these 12 players as being of Muslim background too. The 9 players who speciﬁed their reli-
gion conﬁrmed that they were Muslims, while all the others (who self-declared as “atheist”
or who didn’t specify a religious belonging) had recognizable Muslim (Arabic) ﬁrst names:
Jalal, Nabil, Reza.
We recruited these players using a stratiﬁed (by population density) but not always fully
random recruitment procedure centered on the 21 metro stations in the ethnically diverse
setting of the 19th district of Paris.14 In a fully random protocol, we assigned a weight to
each metro station based on the density of the area in which it is located, with the higher
density stations getting more cards in our random draw. Each recruitment team drew a
metro station for each recruitment day, and then a number from 1 to 10 to determine which
passer-by to invite as a game recruit. But because we wanted to ensure a large number of
interactions between our SX/SM sample and FdS, we deviated from this protocol to assure
ourselves a suﬃcient number of FdS players. When potential subjects who looked as if they
were FdS walked by, recruiters were instructed to ignore the sequence of selection, and to
14According to the 1999 French census, the percentage of individuals living in this district who are born
in France is 63.5 (against 82.4 for all Paris). A good picture of the diversity in the 19th district is oﬀered
in the French ﬁlm “Entre les murs” (“The Class” in its English-language version) that received the Palme
d’Or at the 2008 Cannes Film Festival.
7ask them to participate in our experiment. Passers-by who were willing to hear our appeal
were told that they could win up to 148 euros for about two and a half hours of game
participation,15 games which were designed to investigate “how people from Ile-de-France
[Parisian region] make decisions about money.”
Turn-downs were about 30 percent, introducing some bias that likely leads to an over-
representation of individuals favorable to diversity among our sample (relative to a random
sample of game participants). Indeed, those individuals who agreed to participate in our
experiments eﬀectively agreed to be part of an experiment in which they would have to
interact with ethnic and religious “others” from the ethnically diverse Ile-de-France region.
We can test this intuition for FdS players. To do so, we compare the average political ideology
of our FdS sample to that of a random sample of FdS from the 2009 European Social Survey
(“ESS” henceforth). We use a question that measures where respondents stand on a left-
wing/right-wing scale, capturing a tendency to support social change versus a tendency to
preserve traditional values. One’s position on a left wing-right wing scale therefore reveals,
among other things, attitudes toward diversity. In order to obtain a comparable group of FdS
respondents in our experiment and in the ESS, we selected a sub-sample of ESS respondents
who were born in France and whose parents were both born in France. Unfortunately, the
ESS does not provide information about the birthplace of the respondents’ grandparents.
We thus cannot exclude ESS respondents with one or more grandparents born abroad: our
sample of FdS respondents from the ESS is thus, if anything, more open to diversity than
would be a sample of FdS respondents with four grandparents born in metropolitan France
(the deﬁnition of FdS for our experimental games). This bias thus runs against us ﬁnding any
diﬀerence between our FdS players and the FdS respondents in the ESS, since we hypothesize
that our FdS respondents are more open to diversity than a random sample of FdS. Table 1
presents the results of a diﬀerence of means analysis between our FdS and the ESS FdS. It
shows that our FdS sample is, on average, more left-wing than the random sample of FdS
respondents in the 2009 ESS (signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level). These results are
conﬁrmed by an OLS analysis reported in Table 2. In this table, the variable “European
Social Survey” takes the value 1 if the individual is a respondent in the 2009 ESS and 0 if she
is a participant in our 2009 experiment. The coeﬃcient for this variable is always positive
and highly signiﬁcant, whether one controls for the gender (column 2), the age (column 3),
the education (column 4) or the household income (column 5) of the individual. We therefore
15This stands for roughly 8.5 times the hourly minimum wage in France as of 2009.
8have conﬁrmation that FdS participants in our 2009 experiments are more open to diversity
compared to a representative sample of FdS in France that same year. As a consequence,
our results suﬀer from a bias that leads to an underestimation of anti-Muslim discrimination
on the part of FdS.
2.2 The treatment
The experiment comprised two phases: a registration phase, during which we collected
demographic and behavioral data that we later used for the composition of the player-
sets; and a game phase, during which subjects played a series of experimental games. We
supervised eight sessions of games held in a rented private language school in the 19th
district in Paris, over the course of two weekends, on Friday evenings after work and on
Sunday. For our experiments to be unbiased, we could not give players the impression that
we wanted to know if they were conditioning their moves on the religious backgrounds of our
Senegalese players, and therefore needed to conduct the experiments in a setting in which
the Senegalese players would not appear to be exceptional. The 19th district, with its high
levels of national, ethnic and religious diversity, oﬀered a solution that worked: in the exit
surveys for the experiments, not a single subject speculated that religion had anything to do
with the purposes of the games,16 and only one of the Senegalese players out of a total 27
verbally wondered if there was something odd about having other players in the room who
were from his Senegalese language group.
Each session was comprised of ten players. Based on information learned at registration,
subjects were assigned to a session so as to satisfy three criteria. First, in order to obtain
statistical power, all sessions needed at least two FdS-SM and one FdS-SX interactions,
or the reverse. Second, we needed to “treat” our game sessions properly, by varying their
ethno-religious composition. This allows us to capture the eﬀect of out-group salience, by
comparing the change in FdS generosity toward SM when the number of SM increases,
with the change in FdS generosity toward SX when the number of SX increases. Yet,
to avoid collinearity between the salience of diﬀerent out-groups, we assigned subjects to
a session such that no signiﬁcant correlation could be observed between the number of
subjects of diﬀerent ethno-religious types across the sessions. Table 3 speciﬁes the ethno-
religious composition of each session, by distinguishing between players of European and
16In the exit questionnaire, we asked: “Que pensez-vous que notre ´ equipe aura appris sur vous ` a travers
vos d´ ecisions aujourd’hui?” [What do you think our team will have learned about you from the decisions
you made today?].
9Judeo-Christian background, players of African and Judeo-Christian background, players
of African and Muslim background, and players of North African and Muslim background.
The number of SM varies from 1 (in sessions 1 and 7) to 3 (in sessions 5 and 8), while the
number of SX varies from 1 (in sessions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7) to 2 (in sessions 2, 6 and 8).17 Third, to
test the eﬀect of mixed gender versus non mixed gender sessions in a subsequent paper, we
supervised three all male sessions, three all female sessions and two mixed gender sessions.
Despite these constraints, players were also assigned to game sessions according to their
availability. One might therefore worry that players self-selected into sessions, and therefore
into treatments, in a systematic manner that might bias our results. Yet none of our players
were aware of the ethnic composition of the sessions when they made their choice. Still, we
ensure that FdS participating in sessions with high numbers of SM (SX) do not diﬀer from
FdS participating in sessions with low numbers of SM (SX), by controlling in our regressions
for the gender, age, education, household income and religiosity of FdS players, as well as
for whether they know players who participated in previous game sessions. We face a similar
concern with our Senegalese players: SM (SX) participating in sessions with high numbers of
their in-group could diﬀer from SM (SX) participating in sessions with low numbers of their
in-group. Indeed, it might be that more religious SM (SX) are more available to play games
on Sundays (Fridays) and we would therefore observe a higher number of religious SM (SX)
on Sundays (Fridays). In other words, there is the possibility that the degree of religiosity
of our Senegalese Muslim players is correlated with their probability of being available on
Friday rather than Sunday (and conversely for our Senegalese Christian players). Due to
low numbers, we cannot run a diﬀerence of means analysis between the degree of religiosity
of SM (SX) in sessions where SM (SX) numbers are high and their degree of religiosity in
sessions where their in-group salience is low. However, in our regressions, we are able to
correct for such potential bias by controlling for the average level of religiosity of SM and
SX players in the session. Our results are robust to the inclusion of such controls (see the
robustness checks).
17The fact that the number of SM varies from 1 to 3, while the number of SX varies from 1 to 2, introduces
a concern: could the Hortefeux eﬀect derive from the fact that FdS exposure to SM out-group salience means
an exposure to 3 Senegalese Muslims, while FdS exposure to SX out-group salience means an exposure to 2
Senegalese Christians? In our results section we address this concern and show that the Hortefeux eﬀect is
not driven by this asymmetry.
102.3 The dictator game
We answer our main research question on the impact of Muslim out-group salience on FdS
generosity with data collected from our 2009 dictator game. When they arrived at a game
session, subjects were given a code number. They were then asked to write their ﬁrst names
on a label and to paste that label on their chests. The only information players had about
each other was their looks, their manners, their dress and their ﬁrst names. None wore any
clothes or jewelry revealing religious aﬃliation, with the exception of one non Senegalese
player, who wore a headscarf signaling a Muslim identity.
The 2009 dictator game took place after the group of ten had played a series of simulta-
neous trust games; a speed-chatting game in which all players got to meet ﬁve other players
in four-minute conversations, as in a speed-dating scenario; and a voting game in which each
speed-chatting group elected, among the group of players they had just met, a leader who
would then distribute funds to his/her electorate at his/her discretion.18 Therefore, by the
start of the dictator game, all ten players already knew a good deal of information about
one another, especially due to the speed chatting game.19 However, at no time did any of
our players know the game decisions of any of the other players in their session.
Our experimental setup for the dictator game was the only one to bring together all
players in a single room – hence guaranteeing the activation of group salience eﬀects. All
players (whom we refer to as donors) were shown the same set of six partners (whom we call
recipients) on a large screen revealing only their faces and ascribed ﬁrst names, which we
strategically altered. More precisely, among the six recipients, two were apparent FdS with
typical FdS names, two were ambiguous with alternatively Muslim and Christian names,
such that donors could reasonably think they were FdS with Christian names or North
Africans with Muslim names, and two were apparent black Africans. These last two, a
Senegalese man and a Senegalese woman, were the recipients of interest for this analysis.
18We analyze these other games in separate papers.
19For the speed chatting game, our ten players were placed into two teams of 5, each following the same
protocol. Each player on a team was instructed that he/she would have a few minutes to meet (and we
emphasized, to get to know) each member of the other team, thereby “speed chatting” with ﬁve other
players, sequentially, as in a speed-dating situation. After meeting each partner, players were given 1 minute
to jot down notes on a piece of paper. After meeting all members of the other group, each player received
a sheet of paper with the picture of each person they had just met, and a series of eight personal questions
about them (their age, their religion, their job, whether they had obtained their Baccalaur´ eat (the French
high-school diploma), the country in which they were born, the district in which they live, whether they are
married and their favorite hobby). Players were allowed to consult their notes. For each question subjects
provided their answer, or selected “don’t know”, and indicated whether they learned this information from
their chat, or simply guessed the answer. For each correct answer, subjects earned 1 euro.
11For half of the sessions, subjects viewed one of the ambiguous recipients and one of the
Senegalese recipients with a Christian name, and the other ambiguous recipient as well as
the other Senegalese recipient with a Muslim name; for the other half of the sessions, this
was reversed. By doing so, we avoid any confound between the ethnic type of the recipient
and the face of the recipient, notably when we analyze the amount given by FdS donors
to Senegalese recipients. Put diﬀerently, the fact that FdS donors see the same Senegalese
face with alternated religious identities (one Christian, the other Muslim) allows us to run
a within-face analysis. Figure 1 illustrates the faces and alternating names of our recipients
in the dictator game.
It is important to note that while all recipients were recruited in the 19th district of Paris
in a similar way as the donors, they never participated in our game sessions, and none was
ever known personally by any of the donors. The donors saw the sequence of recipients only
once and were asked to make a decision to allocate a = f0,1,2,3,4,5g euros to each recipient
- out of 5 euros allotted to them each time, being assured that the amounts accruing to each
recipient would actually be transferred to them. Donors were handed an answer sheet and
provided with enough room to record their decisions in a private manner, albeit in a public
space. Although recipients appeared sequentially on the screen, donors could observe the
entire set of recipients on their answer sheet as they recorded their allocation decisions.
3 Experimental results
The dictator game was played after a socialization phase embodied by the speed chatting
game. Prior to this socialization phase, Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2011) ﬁnd that SM
experience discrimination by FdS. Notably, holding the number of SM and SX in the game
session at its average, FdS show taste-based discrimination against SM (especially SM with
recognizable Muslim names); i.e. they are less generous toward SM than toward SX. In
this section, we ﬁrst test whether, holding the number of SM and SX in the game session
at its average, FdS donors show a taste for discrimination toward SM recipients they have
never met before (the recipients on the screen), or whether this taste-based discrimination
is (temporarily) erased thanks to FdS-SM interactions during the speed-chatting game. We
then test for the Hortefeux eﬀect, that is we investigate whether FdS generosity toward SM
is decreased by SM out-group salience in a way that is not matched by the impact of SX out-
group salience on FdS generosity toward SX. Finally, we test whether the Hortefeux eﬀect is
12common knowledge among FdS. More precisely, we investigate whether FdS believe that the
impact of SM out-group salience on FdS generosity toward SM recipients is signiﬁcantly more
negative than the impact of SX out-group salience on FdS generosity toward SX recipients.
3.1 FdS generosity toward SM, holding the number of SM at its
average
We estimate equation (1) over the set of pairs composed of FdS donors and SM and SX
recipients:
y = a + b.(FdS ! SM) + c
′.X + d.Face + e
′.Π + ϵ, (1)
where y refers to the amount given by the donors to the recipients in the dictator game.
The dummy (FdS ! SM) is equal to 1 if the donor is FdS and the recipient is SM and to
0 if the donor is FdS and the recipient is SX. As a consequence, coeﬃcient b captures the
diﬀerence between the amount given by FdS donors to SM recipients and the amount given
by FdS donors to SX recipients. We also control for a vector of socioeconomic characteristics
of FdS donors denoted X. This vector contains information on the gender, age, household
income, education and religiosity of FdS players, as well as on whether they know players
who participated in previous game sessions. To run a within-face analysis, we introduce
the Face dummy that is equal to 1 if the recipient is the Senegalese woman (and 0 if the
recipient is the Senegalese man). To hold the number of Muslims and matched Christians
in the game session at its average, we introduce Π which stands for a vector of session ﬁxed
eﬀects. Finally, standard errors are clustered at the donor level since donations from the
same donor cannot be considered as independent of one other. Note that our results are
robust if we cluster the standard errors at the session level instead.
Table 4 presents OLS estimates from three model speciﬁcations of equation (1). In
column 1, we control for the ethno-religious identity of the donor and of the recipient (i.e.:
we control for the dummy (FdS ! SM)). In column 2, we add the face and the session
ﬁxed eﬀects. In column 3, we include the socioeconomic characteristics of FdS donors. The
non signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the dummy (FdS ! SM) in all three columns (and notably in
columns 2 and 3 where we control for session ﬁxed eﬀects) suggests that FdS donors do not
treat SM and SX recipients diﬀerently when one holds the number of SM and SX in the game
session at its average. This reveals that the socialization phase that preceded the dictator
game erased FdS taste-based discrimination against all SM, whether they interacted with
13those SM during the speed-chatting game or not.
This ﬁnding is consequential for the integration of Muslim immigrants in the French labor
market, which Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2010) have shown to be particularly problematic.20
It indeed suggests that FdS recruiters won’t harbor a taste for discrimination against Muslim
applicants provided they are “forced” to experience basic interactions with them (through job
interviews for instance). This result could support the implementation of the anonymous CV,
which gives equal likelihood of obtaining a job interview to applications that are comparable
in training, experience and skills.21
3.2 FdS generosity toward SM when SM numbers increase
Holding the number of SM and SX in the game session at its average, FdS donors are as
generous toward SM recipients as they are toward SX recipients. Does this result hold once
the number of SM and SX in the game session varies? Tables 5 through 8 present useful
descriptive statistics that provide basic intuitions about the answer. In Table 5, we ﬁnd that
a marginal increase in the number of SM, holding the number of SX constant at 1, yields
non-monotonic results on all outcomes except for the FdS donation to SM recipients, which
decreases monotonically from 2.83 euros in sessions with 1 SM to 1.60 euros in sessions with
2 SM to 0.75 euros in sessions with 3 SM. In Table 6, the marginal increase in the number
of SM, holding constant the number of SX at 2, yields decreases in FdS donations across the
board (average donations and donations toward FdS, North African, SM and SX recipients).
These diﬀerence-of-means reveal a consistent discriminatory reaction toward SM recipients
on the part of FdS donors as SM numbers increase. By contrast, Tables 7 and 8 indicate
inconsistent patterns of FdS generosity when the number of SX increases, holding constant
the number of SM. These diﬀerence-of-means tests bring to light no consistent FdS reaction
to SX group salience.
In Table 9, we run a regression analysis estimating equation (2) over the set of pairs
20Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2010) compare the callbacks for an interview received by two French ap-
plicants of Senegalese background showing the same educational and work experience but diﬀering on the
religion: one is Christian, the other is Muslim. They conﬁrm that the Muslim applicant faces high prejudice
in France in 2009: she is 2.5 times less likely to receive a callback for an interview than is her Christian coun-
terpart. Moreover, through a high-n survey conducted in France among Christian and Muslim households
of Senegalese background, the authors ﬁnd that Muslim households earn, on average, 400 euros less than
Christian households each month (the equivalent of 14% of the average monthly household income for France
in 2009). This income eﬀect is consistent with the discrimination observed in the French labor market.
21In an anonymous CV, the candidates’ ﬁrst and last names, nationality, sex, age and e-mail address are
hidden from the recruiter during the selection process before an interview.
14composed of FdS donors and SM and SX recipients:
y = a + b.(FdS ! SM) + c.(FdS ! SM).nbSM + d.(FdS ! SM).nbSX
+e.nbSM + f.nbSX + g
′.X + h.Face + ϵ, (2)
where y refers to the amount given by the donors to the recipients in the dictator game.
The dummy (FdS ! SM) is equal to 1 if the donor is FdS and the recipient is SM and to
0 if the donor is FdS and the recipient is SX. The variables nbSM and nbSX stand for the
number of SM and SX players, respectively, in the session. As a consequence, coeﬃcient b
captures the diﬀerence between the amount given by FdS donors to SM recipients and the
amount given by FdS donors to SX recipients when there are no SM and no SX in the game
session. The impact of one additional SM in the room on FdS donations to SM recipients
is given by the sum of coeﬃcients c and e. The impact of one additional SX in the room
on FdS donations to SX recipients is captured by coeﬃcient f. We address the possibility
that FdS participating in sessions with high numbers of SM (SX) systematically diﬀer from
FdS participating in sessions with low numbers of SM (SX), by introducing controls for ob-
servable individual socioeconomic characteristics (gender, age, education, household income,
religiosity and whether they know players who participated in previous game sessions) that
are denoted by X. Additionally, in order to run a within-face analysis, we introduce the
dummy Face that is again equal to 1 if the recipient is the Senegalese woman (and 0 if the
recipient is the Senegalese man). Finally, standard errors are clustered at the donor level
since donations from the same donor cannot be considered as independent of one other. Note
that our results are robust if we cluster the standard errors at the session level instead.
Table 9, relying on OLS estimates of equation (2), reports results from three model
speciﬁcations. In column 1, we control for the ethno-religious identity of the donor and
of the recipient, for the number of SM and SX in the game session, as well as for the
interactions between these two sets of variables. In column 2, we add the Face dummy in
order to run a within-face analysis. In column 3, we include the socioeconomic characteristics
of FdS donors. Our results ﬁrst show that, in all three columns, having one more SM in
the room signiﬁcantly decreases FdS donations to SM recipients, as revealed by the sum of
the coeﬃcients c and e that appear in rows (2) and (4) in Table 9 (see the p-value of the
ﬁrst Wald test reported at the bottom of Table 9). Second, we observe that the impact
of having one more SX in the room on FdS donations to SX recipients is positive, though
not robustly signiﬁcant, as shown by the coeﬃcient f that appears in row (5) in Table 9.
15Third, the p-value of the last Wald test reported at the bottom of Table 9 indicates that the
diﬀerence between these two impacts is strongly signiﬁcant across all model speciﬁcations,
conﬁrming our main result that FdS generosity toward SM recipients is decreased by SM
out-group salience in a way that is not matched by the impact of SX out-group salience on
FdS generosity toward SX.22
This ﬁnding suggests that, in the context of the French labor market, the expected
discrimination-reducing impact of the anonymous CV would typically be short-lived once
more than one Muslim employee populates the workforce. Indeed, increasing numbers of
Muslims in the workforce will activate discrimination among the rooted French employers
and therefore lower the chances for Muslim applicants to be hired (compared to matched
Christian applicants).
3.3 FdS beliefs about other FdS generosity toward SM when SM
numbers increase
Is the Hortefeux eﬀect common knowledge? Do FdS believe that the impact of SM out-
group salience on FdS generosity toward SM recipients is signiﬁcantly more negative than
the impact of SX out-group salience on FdS generosity toward SX recipients? To answer
this question, we rely on the strategic dictator game which immediately followed the dictator
game we have been analyzing so far. To introduce the strategic dictator game, our monitors
explained that one of the players in the group would be chosen at random as the “model”.
This was a lie allowing us always to choose an FdS player without priming our subjects
to the ethnicity of the model.23 Players were then told to guess the amount the model
had allocated to each of the recipients in the dictator game. They were also told that the
player who guessed most closely to the actual decisions of the model would receive a prize of
30 euros. The strategic dictator game therefore helps us determine FdS beliefs about FdS
22We address the concern that the Hortefeux eﬀect might be driven by an asymmetry between SM out-
group salience (going from 1 to 3 SM) and SX out-group salience (going from 1 to 2 SX). First, Table 5,
columns (a) and (b) indicate that FdS donations to SM when SM numbers increase from 1 to 2 decrease
from 2.83 euros to 1.60 euros, a substantively large though not signiﬁcant eﬀect (p=0.15). Therefore, the
pattern that characterizes the Hortefeux eﬀect holds when SM out-group salience is limited to an increase
from 1 to 2 SM. Second, Table 8 suggests that including cases where the number of SM in the session is
equal to 3 might actually work against ﬁnding an Hortefeux eﬀect. Indeed, FdS donations to SX, when SX
out-group salience increases and when the number of SM in the session is equal to 3, decrease from 2.50
euros to 2 euros. Finally, we re-run the analysis in Table 9, excluding sessions where the number of SM is
equal to 3. This reduces our power from 42 to 30 observations. We ﬁnd that our substantive results hold,
though their statistical signiﬁcance weakens.
23For purposes of ethical oversight, all experimental protocols were reviewed and approved by the Stanford
University IRB.
16generosity for diﬀerent levels of SM and SX out-group salience.
More precisely, we estimate equation (3) over the set of triads composed of FdS guessers,
FdS donors, and SM and SX recipients:
y = a + b.(FdS   FdS ! SM)
+c.(FdS   FdS ! SM).nbSM + d.(FdS   FdS ! SM).nbSX
+e.nbSM + f.nbSX + g
′.X + h.Face + ϵ, (3)
where y refers to FdS guesses about other FdS donations to SM and SX recipients. The
dummy (FdS   FdS ! SM) is equal to 1 if the guesser is FdS, the donor is FdS and the
recipient is SM and to 0 if the guesser is FdS, the donor is FdS and the recipient is SX. The
variables nbSM and nbSX again stand for the number of SM and SX players, respectively,
in the session. As a consequence, coeﬃcient b captures the diﬀerence between FdS guesses
about other FdS donations to SM recipients and FdS guesses about other FdS donations to
SX recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the game session. The impact of
one additional SM in the room on FdS guesses about other FdS donations to SM recipients
is given by the sum of coeﬃcients c and e. The impact of one additional SX in the room on
FdS guesses about other FdS donations to SX recipients is captured by coeﬃcient f. We
control for a series of socioeconomic characteristics of FdS guessers (gender, age, education,
household income, religiosity and whether they know players who participated in previous
game sessions) that are denoted by X. Additionally, in order to run a within-face analysis,
we introduce the Face dummy that is again equal to 1 if the recipient is the Senegalese
woman (and 0 if the recipient is the Senegalese man). Finally, standard errors are clustered
at the guesser level since guesses from the same guesser cannot be considered as independent
of one other. Note that our results are robust if we cluster the standard errors at the session
level instead.
OLS estimates of equation (3) are presented in Table 10 which reports results from the
three model speciﬁcations already presented in Table 9. First, we draw the reader’s attention
to coeﬃcient f in row (5), which indicates that FdS believe other FdS are signiﬁcantly more
generous to SX when the number of SX increases across all model speciﬁcations. Second,
we examine the eﬀect of SM out-group salience on FdS beliefs about FdS donations to SM
recipients (the sum of coeﬃcients c and e that appear in rows (2) and (4) respectively). This
eﬀect is negative (although not signiﬁcantly so). Third, the Wald test reported at the bottom
17of the table indicates that the diﬀerence between these two eﬀects is strongly signiﬁcant across
all model speciﬁcations. Overall, these results indicate that FdS correctly believe that the
impact of SM out-group salience on FdS generosity toward SM recipients is signiﬁcantly more
negative than the impact of SX out-group salience on FdS generosity toward SX recipients.
The fact that the Hortefeux eﬀect is common knowledge may provide implicit justiﬁcation
for all FdS to act in conformity with the expected prejudicial behavior of in-group members
following an increase in the size of the Muslim out-group. In other words, FdS may consider
anti-social behavior toward Muslims in an environment with several Muslims around them
as normal – so normal that former Minister Hortefeux could state it in a self-assured and
unreﬂective manner.
This ﬁnding helps us further account for anti-Muslim discrimination in the French labor
market. It highlights the fact that even a French employer who has no case against any
particular Muslim will have a clear economic interest in favoring Christian applicants over
matched Muslim applicants. Our results indeed suggest that an FdS employer would an-
ticipate that an open employment policy would activate discriminatory behavior among his
ﬁrm’s employees and customers, thereby threatening the esprit de corps of the company as
well as the comfort of its FdS customers.
4 Response to changes in non-FdS behaviors or changes
in FdS preferences?
Understanding the mechanism underlying the Hortefeux eﬀect constitutes the second ob-
jective of this paper. In this section, we develop a rational model augmented with other-
regarding preferences to better understand the behavior of FdS donors in the dictator game.
This model diﬀerentiates between two mechanisms: the decrease in FdS generosity toward
Muslims when Muslim numbers increase may be a response to changes in the behavior of
non-FdS when Muslim numbers increase; it may also result from changes in FdS preferences
and notably from the activation of FdS taste-based discrimination against Muslims when
FdS are surrounded by Muslims. We run an empirical test to identify which of these two
mechanisms (or both) is (are) at work.
184.1 A rational model to account for FdS donors’ behavior
Let us consider the following objective function of a FdS donor:
U = u(c,ω1θ1,...,ω4θ4),
where u is an increasing and concave function. The ﬁrst argument c stands for the con-
sumption of the FdS donor and is given by c = R 
∑j=4
j=1yj where R is the total endowment
received by the FdS donor in the dictator game and yj stands for the donation of the FdS
donor to the recipient of ethno-religious type j. As shown by Figure 1, each game session
is characterized by 6 recipients who are of 4 diﬀerent ethno-religious types: 3 are FdS, 1 is
SM, 1 is SX and 1 is (Muslim) North African. For the sake of simplicity and without loss
of generality, we assume in this model that there are as many recipients as there are ethno-
religious types, hence 4 recipients. In the other arguments of function u, ωj (j = 1,...,4)
stands for the weight that the FdS donor assigns to the consumption of the recipient of
ethno-religious type j. The consumption of the recipient of ethno-religious type j is given
by θj = yj +Yj +Zj, where Yj refers to the donations of all other FdS donors to the recipient
of ethno-religious type j, while Zj refers to the donations of all other non-FdS donors to the
recipient of ethno-religious type j.
In what follows, we analyze the optimal behavior of FdS donors when the donations of
non-FdS donors are given. Consistent with our experimental setup where players are not
allowed to communicate with each other, we assume that FdS donors play non cooperatively.
More precisely, each FdS donor chooses the vector of donations y = (y1,y2,y3,y4). For each







= 0,j = 1,..,4. (4)
Let us restrict the analysis to the case of a unique and therefore symmetric equilibrium
(i.e.: an equilibrium where all FdS donors make the same donations). Thus θj = Nyj + Zj,
where N represents the number of FdS donors. In that setting, equation (4) shows that y will
change following an increase in the number of SM if Z = (Z1,...,Z4) changes, meaning that
changes in FdS behaviors are a response to changes in non-FdS behaviors. For instance, the
Hortefeux eﬀect can emerge if SM intra-group generosity increases with SM group salience to
a greater extent than does SX intra-group generosity with SX group salience. In that case,
there can be an opportunity for FdS donors to free ride on SM donors’ generosity toward
19SM recipients following SM group salience. Similarly, the Hortefeux eﬀect can emerge if
SM generosity toward FdS recipients decreases with SM group salience to a greater extent
than does SX generosity toward FdS with SX group salience. In that case, there can be
an opportunity for FdS donors to compensate FdS recipients (and therefore give less to SM
recipients) following SM out-group salience. Alternatively, the Hortefeux eﬀect can emerge if
the positive weight that FdS donors assign to the well-being of SM recipients is a decreasing
function of the relative size of the SM minority. As equation (4) shows, y can also change
following an increase in the number of SM if Ω = (ω1,...,ω4) changes. 24
4.2 An empirical test to identify the mechanism at work
Does the Hortefeux eﬀect emerge because FdS donors respond to changes in the behavior of
non-FdS donors when SM numbers increase, or because FdS donors assign a lower weight
to the well-being of SM recipients when SM number increase? A suﬃcient condition for






= 0 for all j,
where NSM and NSX stand for the number of SM and SX in the game session respectively.
Let us test whether this suﬃcient condition holds, that is whether the amount given
by non-FdS donors to each of the 4 ethno-religious types of recipients is unaﬀected by the
number of SM and the number of SX in the session. To do so, we estimate equation (6) over
the set of pairs composed of non-FdS donors and all 4 ethno-religious types of recipients
24Note that these predictions rely on the assumption that equilibrium y is unique. If this assumption is
relaxed, then changes in FdS behaviors following an increase in the number of SM could simply stem from
the fact that FdS donors coordinate on a diﬀerent equilibrium when SM numbers increase (as compared
to the equilibrium they play when there are few SM around them). More precisely, if several equilibria
exist, the Hortefeux eﬀect can emerge because FdS donors coordinate on the equilibrium “giving less to SM
recipients” when SM numbers increase. This situation makes sense in the case of strategic complementarity
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@c@(!jj) < 0, that is if the marginal utility of consumption of the FdS donor decreases
with the donations received by the recipient of ethno-religious type j.
20(FdS, SM, SX, North African):
y = a + b.(non-FdS ! SM) + c.(non-FdS ! SM).nbSM + d.(non-FdS ! SM).nbSX
+e.(non-FdS ! FdS) + f.(non-FdS ! FdS).nbSM + g.(non-FdS ! FdS).nbSX
+h.(non-FdS ! NA) + i.(non-FdS ! NA).nbSM + j.(non-FdS ! NA).nbSX
+k.nbSM + l.nbSX + m
′.X + ϵ, (6)
where y refers to the amount given by the donors to the recipients in the dictator game.
The dummy (non-FdS ! SM) is equal to 1 if the donor is non-FdS and the recipient is SM,
and to 0 otherwise. The dummy (non-FdS ! FdS) is equal to 1 if the donor is non-FdS and
the recipient is FdS, and to 0 otherwise. The dummy (non-FdS ! NA) is equal to 1 if the
donor is non-FdS and the recipient is North African, and to 0 otherwise.
The amount given by non-FdS donors to SX recipients when there are no SM and no SX
donors in the game session is the reference category. Therefore, coeﬃcient b captures the
diﬀerence between the amount given by non-FdS donors to SM recipients and the amount
given by non-FdS donors to SX recipients, when there are no SM and no SX donors in the
game session; coeﬃcient e captures the diﬀerence between the amount given by non-FdS
donors to FdS recipients and the amount given by non-FdS donors to SX recipients, when
there are no SM and no SX donors in the game session; coeﬃcient h captures the diﬀerence
between the amount given by non-FdS donors to North-African recipients and the amount
given by non-FdS donors to SX recipients, when there are no SM and no SX donors in the
game session.
The variables nbSM and nbSX stand for the number of SM and SX players, respectively,
in the game session. Therefore, the marginal impact of one additional SM (SX) in the room
on FdS donations to SM recipients (as compared to the amount given by non-FdS donors to
SM recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session) is given by the sum
of coeﬃcients c and k (d and l); the marginal impact of one additional SM (SX) in the room
on FdS donations to FdS recipients (as compared to the amount given by non-FdS donors to
FdS recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session) is given by the sum
of coeﬃcients f and k (g and l); the marginal impact of one additional SM (SX) in the room
on FdS donations to North African recipients (as compared to the amount given by non-FdS
donors to North African recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session)
is given by the sum of coeﬃcients i and k (j and l); the marginal impact of one additional
21SM (SX) in the room on FdS donations to SX recipients (as compared to the amount given
by non-FdS donors to SX recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session)
is given by coeﬃcient k (l).
We also control for a series of socioeconomic characteristics of the non-FdS donors (gen-
der, age, education, household income, religiosity and whether they know players who par-
ticipated in previous game sessions) that are denoted by X. Finally, standard errors are
clustered at the donor level since donations from the same donor cannot be considered as
independent of one other. Note that our results are robust if we cluster the standard errors
at the session level instead.
Table 11 presents results from three model speciﬁcations for OLS estimates of equation
(6). In column 1, we control for the ethno-religious identity of the donor and of the recipient,
for the number of SM and SX in the game session, as well as for the interactions between these
two sets of variables. In column 2, we include the socioeconomic characteristics of non-FdS
donors. Since, this inclusion generates a reduction in the sample size from 354 observations
to 294 observations due to missing values for the income, education and religiosity of some
of the non-FdS donors, we run a multiple imputation analysis in column 3. The p-values of
the Wald tests reported at the bottom of Table 11 show that the amount given by non-FdS
donors to each of the 4 ethno-religious types of recipients is impacted neither by the number
of SM, nor by the number of SX in the game session.
In other words, FdS donors are the only donors in the dictator game to change their
behavior when Muslim numbers increase. They therefore do not respond to changes in the
behavior of non-FdS with SM out-group salience. Notably, the Hortefeux eﬀect does not
emerge because SM intra-group generosity increases with SM group salience in a way that
is not matched by the eﬀect of SX group salience on SX intra-group generosity (see Table
A1 in the Appendix that conﬁrms that the diﬀerence between these two impacts is never
signiﬁcant). Neither does the Hortefeux eﬀect emerge because SM generosity toward FdS
recipients decreases with SM group salience in a way that is not matched by the eﬀect
of SX group salience on SX generosity toward FdS (see Table A2 in the Appendix that
conﬁrms that the diﬀerence between these two impacts is never signiﬁcant). Rather, relying
on equation (4), the Hortefeux eﬀect can only emerge because SM out-group salience has
an impact on Ω, the vector of weights that FdS donors assign to the consumption of the
diﬀerent ethno-religious types of recipients. More precisely, the Hortefeux eﬀect derives from
an activation of FdS distaste toward Muslims with Muslim out-group salience.
22One could object that the Hortefeux eﬀect arises because FdS donors wrongly anticipate
that non-FdS donors change their donations when Muslim numbers increase. Although we
do not have information on FdS actual beliefs about non-FdS reactions to SM out-group
salience, we consider this assumption unrealistic. First, we know that FdS beliefs about
other FdS reactions to SM out-group salience (as compared to SX out-group salience) are
correct, which is not consistent with FdS misreading other players’ behavior. Second, our
FdS players stem from the ethnically diverse 19th district of Paris. They therefore have many
opportunities outside the lab to update their beliefs about non-FdS (and notably Muslim)
behavior when Muslim numbers increase. If they fail to do so, we believe that this should be
attributed to their anti-Muslim prejudice that is exacerbated in that context and therefore
prevents them from interacting productively with Muslims.
5 Robustness checks
Two factors could challenge our results. First, as already mentioned, SM (SX) participating
in sessions with high numbers of their in-group could diﬀer from SM (SX) participating in
sessions with low numbers of their in-group. Indeed, it might be that more religious SM
(SX) are more available to play games on Sundays (Fridays) and we would therefore observe
a higher number of religious SM (SX) on Sundays (Fridays). In other words, SM (SX) out-
group salience could partly capture the eﬀect of being in contact with religious SM (SX). It
is therefore necessary to correct for this potential bias by controlling for the average level of
religiosity of SM and SX players in the game session. Second, we already emphasized that
we assigned subjects to a game session such that no signiﬁcant correlation could be observed
between the number of subjects of diﬀerent ethno-religious types across the game sessions.
Yet, it could still be that SM and SX out-group salience partly captures the eﬀect of the
group salience of other ethno-religious types of players. To rule out this possibility, we must
control for the out-group salience of these other ethno-religious types of players: FdS, other
players of European and Judeo-Christian background, other players of African and Judeo-
Christian background, other players of African and Muslim background and players of North
African and Muslim background. In this section, we implement these two robustness checks
for each of our three main results: the Hortefeux eﬀect; FdS beliefs that the impact of
SM out-group salience on other FdS generosity toward SM recipients is signiﬁcantly more
negative than the impact of SX out-group salience on FdS generosity toward SX recipients;
23and the unchanged behavior of non-FdS donors when SM or SX numbers increase.
5.1 The Hortefeux eﬀect
Is the Hortefeux eﬀect robust to the control for the average religiosity of SM and SX players
and for the out-group salience of other ethno-religious types of players? Results from our
robustness checks are reported in Table 12. In column 1, we reproduce the OLS estimates
of equation (2) (these OLS estimates were initially displayed in column 3 of Table 9). In
column 2, we control for the average religiosity of SM and SX players in each game session.
In column (3), we control for the out-group salience of other ethno-religious types of players.
More precisely, column 3 provides the OLS estimates of the following version of equation
(2):
y = a + b.(FdS ! SM) + c.(FdS ! SM).nbSM + d.(FdS ! SM).nbSX
+e.nbSM + f.nbSX + g
′.X + h.Face
+i.(FdS ! SM).nbOEJC + j.(FdS ! SM).nbOAJC + k.(FdS ! SM).nbOAM
+l.(FdS ! SM).nbNA + m.nbOEJC + n.nbOAJC + o.nbOAM + p.nbNA + ϵ,
where the variables nbOEJC, nbOAJC, nbOAM and nbNA stand for the number of other
players (i.e. not FdS) of European and Judeo-Christian background, other players (i.e. not
SX) of African and Judeo-Christian background, other players (i.e. not SM) of African and
Muslim background and players of North African and Muslim background, respectively. As
a consequence, coeﬃcient b captures the diﬀerence between the amount given by FdS donors
to SM recipients and the amount given by FdS donors to SX recipients when there are only
FdS donors in the game session.
The Hortefeux eﬀect is robust to the control for the average religiosity of SM and SX
players in each game session (column 2) and to the control for the eﬀect of the out-group
salience of other ethno-religious types of players. Having one more SM in the room signiﬁ-
cantly decreases FdS donations to SM recipients (as compared to the situation where there
are only FdS donors in the room), as revealed by the sum of the coeﬃcients c and e that
appear in rows (2) and (4) in Table 12 (see the p-value of the ﬁrst Wald test reported at the
bottom of Table 12). Coeﬃcient f in row (5) in Table 12 indicates that the impact of having
one more SX in the room on FdS donations to SX recipients (as compared to the situation
where there are only FdS donors in the room) is not signiﬁcant. Yet, the p-value of the last
24Wald test reported at the bottom of Table 12 indicates that the diﬀerence between these
two impacts is strongly signiﬁcant, conﬁrming our main result that FdS generosity toward
SM recipients is decreased by SM out-group salience in a way that is not matched by the
impact of SX out-group salience on FdS generosity toward SX.
5.2 The Hortefeux eﬀect as common knowledge
Is the Hortefeux eﬀect still common knowledge among rooted French when we control for
the average religiosity of SM and SX players and for the out-group salience of other ethno-
religious types of players? Results from our robustness checks are reported in Table 13. In
column 1, we reproduce the OLS estimates of equation (3) (these OLS estimates were initially
displayed in column 3 of Table 10). In column 2, we control for the average religiosity of
SM and SX players in each game session. In column 3, we control for the group salience of
other ethno-religious types of players.
We again ﬁnd support for FdS believing that the impact of SM out-group salience on
other FdS generosity toward SM recipients is more negative than the impact of SX out-group
salience on FdS generosity toward SX recipients. The diﬀerence between these two impacts
is close to statistical signiﬁcance in column 2 (the p-value of the last Wald test reported
at the bottom of Table 13 is equal to 0.15) and is signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level in
column 3.
5.3 The unchanged behavior of non-FdS donors when SM or SX
numbers increase
Are non-FdS donors still unaﬀected by SM and SX out-group salience when we control for
the average religiosity of SM and SX players and for the out-group salience of other ethno-
religious types of players? Results from our robustness checks are reported in Table 14.
In column 1, we reproduce the OLS estimates of equation (5) when a multiple imputation
analysis is conducted (these OLS estimates were initially displayed in column 3 of Table
11).25 In column 2, we control for the average religiosity of SM and SX players in each
game session. In column 3, we control for the group salience of other ethno-religious types
of players.
The p-values of the Wald tests reported at the bottom of Table 14 conﬁrm that the
25Our results hold when the robustness checks are run without a multiple imputation analysis.
25amount given by non-FdS donors to each of the 4 ethno-religious types of recipients is
impacted neither by the number of SM, nor by the number of SX in the game session, with
the exception of the amount given by non-FdS donors to North African recipients. Column 3
indicates that this amount increases with the number of SM in the game session (signiﬁcant
at the 10% level). However, this result does not undermine our conclusion that changes
in FdS generosity toward SM recipients when SM numbers increase is not a response to
changes in non-FdS generosity when SM and SX numbers increase. The sign of the impact
of SM group salience on non-FdS generosity toward North African recipients is indeed not
consistent with the Hortefeux eﬀect: non-FdS donors give more to North African recipients
when SM numbers increase, not less. If FdS donors were responding to this change, then we
would observe that they give more, not less, to SM recipients (in order to compensate them)
when SM numbers increase.
6 Conclusion
Relying on experimental games bringing together rooted French and a set of immigrants dif-
fering only on religion, we ﬁnd that FdS generosity toward Muslims is signiﬁcantly decreased
with Muslim out-group salience. No such result is obtained with the impact of Christian
out-group salience on FdS generosity toward matched Christians. We portray this result
on Muslim out-group salience as the Hortefeux eﬀect, lending support to the group threat
theory. Moreover, based on a rational model and an empirical test of the mechanisms this
model uncovers, we identify that the Hortefeux eﬀect derives from an activation of FdS
taste-based discrimination against Muslims when Muslim numbers increase.
Our ﬁndings are critical for explaining Muslims’ economic handicap today and predict-
ing its evolution in the next decades, not only in France but also in other Western countries
provided our results hold there as well.26 First, the simple expectation that the presence of
several Muslim employees exacerbates distaste among the rooted workforce and customers
motivates any recruiter, even if she has no case against any particular Muslim, to screen
out Muslim applicants, eﬀectively discriminating on the basis of perceived religion.27 Sec-
ond, other things held constant, anti-Muslim prejudice will increase in the future with the
predicted growing share of Muslim immigrants in Western countries, potentially becoming
26We intend to replicate our experimental set-up in a number of European countries.
27Our ﬁndings also oﬀer an explanation for religious discrimination that might exist in other markets that
are critical for successful economic integration of immigrants, such as the housing and marriage markets.
26a source of deep social tensions.
Solutions to discrimination against Muslims are of urgent concern. As shown by Paluck
and Green (2009), evidence on prejudice-reducing policies is at best inconclusive, such that
there is so far no eﬃcient intervention to ﬁght against anti-Muslim discrimination. We hope
that the search for policies that work eﬀectively to reduce anti-Muslim prejudice will be
aided by our identiﬁcation of one of the mechanisms – i.e. the activation of distaste toward
Muslims by Muslim out-group salience – that sustain it.
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29Tables and Figures
Table 1: Position of “FdS” respondents to the 2009 ESS and of FdS participants in our 2009 experiments
on a left wing-right wing scale. Diﬀerence of means analysis.




Notes: The table reports a diﬀerence of means analysis. The variable of interest captures the position of re-
spondents on a left wing-right wing scale. It ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 means “more leftist than rightist”,
2 means “in-between” and 3 means “more rightist than leftist.”
Table 2: Position of “FdS” respondents to the 2009 ESS and of FdS participants in our 2009 experiment
on a left wing-right wing scale. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Position on a left wing-right wing scale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) European Social Survey 0.516*** 0.522*** 0.517*** 0.473** 0.447**
(0.177) (0.176) (0.179) (0.191) (0.198)
(2) Female 0.063 0.054 0.046 -0.007
(0.183) (0.202) (0.203) (0.211)
(3) Age 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
(4) Education -0.093 -0.050
(0.105) (0.111)
(5) Household income -0.130
(0.089)
R2 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.074 0.110
Observations 83 83 83 83 75
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the individual. The dependent
variable is categorical. It ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 means “more leftist than rightist”, 2 means
“in-between” and 3 means “more rightist than leftist.” “European Social Survey” is a dummy that
takes the value 1 if the individual is a respondent to the 2009 ESS, and the value 0 if she is a partici-
pant in our 2009 experiments. “Female” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual is female
and the value 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the individual. “Education” is a categorical
variable that ranges from 1 (less than lower secondary completed) to 4 (post secondary completed).
“Household income” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (ﬁrst quintile) to 5 (ﬁfth quintile).
Standard errors are robust. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
30Table 3: Variations in the ethno-religious composition of player-sets across game sessions.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
Players of European and Judeo-Christian background 4 3 2 3 5 5 4 3
Among which FdS 4 2 2 3 4 2 2 2
Players of African and Judeo-Christian background 2 4 2 2 1 2 2 2
Among which SX 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
Players of African and Muslim background 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 4
Among which SM 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 3
Players of North African and Muslim background 2 1 4 3 0 0 1 1
Figure 1: Variations in the ethno-religious identity of the recipients in the dictator game.
31Table 4: FdS generosity toward SM and SX recipients, holding the number of SM and SX at their
averages. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: FdS donations to SM and SX
(1) (2) (3)












(7) Knows players from previous sessions 0.214
(1.336)
Face ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
Session ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.352 0.427 0.587
Observations 42 42 42
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed by a FdS donor and
a SM or SX recipient. The dependent variable is categorical. It ranges from 0 (the donor gives nothing
to the recipient) to 5 (the donor gives her total endowment to the recipient). “FdS ! SM” is a dummy
that takes the value 1 if the donor is FdS and the recipient is SM, and the value 0 if the donor is FdS
and the recipient is SX. “Female” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor is female and the value
0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the donor. “Education” is a categorical variable that ranges
from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed). “Household
income” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than
7,500 euros monthly). “Religiosity” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (never attends religious
services) to 7 (attends religious services several times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions”
is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor knows players who participated in previous game ses-
sions and the value 0 otherwise. The coeﬃcient in row (1) stands for the diﬀerence between the amount
given by FdS donors to SM recipients and the amount given by FdS donors to SX recipients. Standard
errors are clustered at the donor level. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
32Table 5: Impact of one additional SM on FdS donors’ generosity, holding the number of SX equal to 1.
FdS donors’ Session with 1 SM Session with 2 SM Session with 3 SM Diﬀ Diﬀ Diﬀ
donations (a) (b) (c) (b-a) (c-b) (c-a)
Average 2.06 1.03 1.83 -1.03 +0.80 -0.23
donations (N=36) (N=30) (N=24) p=0.00 p=0.01 p=0.50
Donations to 1.67 0.93 2.00 -0.74 +1.07 +0.33
FdS (N=18) (N=15) (N=12) p=0.06 p=0.02 p=0.48
Donations to 2.17 1.00 1.75 -1.17 +0.75 -0.42
North Africans (N=6) (N=5) (N=4) p=0.07 p=0.43 p=0.63
Donations to 2.83 1.60 0.75 -1.23 -0.85 -2.08
SM (N=6) (N=5) (N=4) p=0.15 p=0.19 p=0.02
Donations to 2.33 0.80 2.50 -1.53 +1.70 +0.17
SX (N=6) (N=5) (N=4) p=0.02 p=0.07 p=0.84
Table 6: Impact of one additional SM on FdS donors’ generosity, holding the number of SX equal to 2.
FdS donors’ Session with 2 SM Session with 3 SM Diﬀ
donations (a) (b) (b-a)
Average 2.33 1.92 -0.42
donations (N=24) (N=12) p=0.41
Donations to 1.83 1.67 -0.16
FdS (N=12) (N=6) p=0.83
Donations to 2.50 1.50 -1.00
North Africans (N=4) (N=2) p=0.62
Donations to 3.50 3.00 -0.50
SM (N=4) (N=2) p=0.72
Donations to 2.50 2.00 -0.50
SX (N=4) (N=2) p=0.71
33Table 7: Impact of one additional SX on FdS donors’ generosity, holding the number of SM equal to 2.
FdS donors’ Session with 1 SX Session with 2 SX Diﬀ
donations (a) (b) (b-a)
Average 1.03 2.33 +1.30
donations (N=30) (N=24) p=0.00
Donations to 0.93 1.83 +1.33
FdS (N=15) (N=12) p=0.05
Donations to 1.00 2.50 +1.50
North Africans (N=5) (N=4) p=0.03
Donations to 1.60 3.50 +1.90
SM (N=5) (N=4) p=0.06
Donations to 0.80 2.50 +1.70
SX (N=5) (N=4) p=0.01
Table 8: Impact of one additional SX on FdS donors’ generosity, holding the number of SM equal to 3.
FdS donors’ Session with 1 SX Session with 2 SX Diﬀ
donations (a) (b) (b-a)
Average 1.83 1.92 +0.09
donations (N=24) (N=12) p=0.87
Donations to 2.00 1.67 -0.33
FdS (N=12) (N=6) p=0.67
Donations to 1.75 1.50 -0.25
North Africans (N=4) (N=2) p=0.90
Donations to 0.75 3.00 +2.25
SM (N=4) (N=2) p=0.25
Donations to 2.50 2.00 -0.50
SX (N=4) (N=2) p=0.72
34Table 9: FdS generosity toward SM and SX recipients when SM and SX numbers increase. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: FdS donations to SM and SX
(1) (2) (3)
(1) FdS ! SM 0.265 2.369* 2.369*
(1.030) (1.201) (1.319)
(2) (FdS ! SM)*Number of SM -0.904** -0.970** -0.970**
(0.416) (0.388) (0.427)
(3) (FdS ! SM)*Number of SX 1.422* -0.010 -0.010
(0.720) (0.852) (0.936)
(4) Number of SM -0.084 -0.051 -0.067
(0.384) (0.367) (0.273)












(11) Knows players from previous sessions 0.550
(0.894)
Face ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=0 0.01 0.01 0.01
P-value of the Wald test: (5)=0 0.33 0.03 0.03
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=(5) 0.02 0.00 0.00
R2 0.308 0.364 0.563
Observations 42 42 42
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed by a FdS donor and
a SM or SX recipient. The dependent variable is categorical. It ranges from 0 (the donor gives nothing
to the recipient) to 5 (the donor gives her total endowment to the recipient). “FdS ! SM” is a dummy
that takes the value 1 if the donor is FdS and the recipient is SM, and the value 0 if the donor is FdS
and the recipient is SX. “Number of SM” is equal to the number of SM in the game session. “Number
of SX” is equal to the number of SX in the game session. “Female” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if
the donor is female and the value 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the donor. “Education” is a
categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college
degree completed). “Household income” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros
monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “Religiosity” is a categorical variable that ranges from
1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious services several times a week). “Knows players
from previous sessions” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor knows players who participated in
previous game sessions and the value 0 otherwise. The sum of the coeﬃcients in rows (2) and (4) stands
for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to SM recipients when there are no SM and no SX
donors in the session, of having one additional SM in the game session. The coeﬃcient in row (5) stands
for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to SX recipients when there are no SM and no SX
donors in the session, of having one additional SX in the game session. Standard errors are clustered at
the donor level. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
35Table 10: FdS guesses about other FdS generosity toward SM and SX recipients when SM and SX
numbers increase. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: FdS guesses about FdS donations to SM and SX
(1) (2) (3)
(1) FdS   FdS ! SM 0.849 3.447** 3.447**
(0.878) (1.485) (1.632)
(2) (FdS   FdS ! SM)*Number of SM -0.464 -0.545 -0.545
(0.360) (0.318) (0.350)
(3) (FdS   FdS ! SM)*Number of SX 0.283 -1.485 -1.485
(0.512) (0.948) (1.041)
(4) Number of SM 0.108 0.149 0.254
(0.416) (0.387) (0.298)












(11) Knows players from previous sessions -1.582**
(0.714)
Face ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=0 0.33 0.31 0.35
P-value of the Wald test: (5)=0 0.03 0.00 0.00
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=(5) 0.02 0.00 0.00
R2 0.269 0.350 0.563
Observations 42 42 42
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a triad formed by a FdS guesser, a FdS donor and a SM
or SX recipient. The dependent variable is categorical. It ranges from 0 (the guesser guesses that the donor gives nothing to
the recipient) to 5 (the guesser guesses that the donor gives her total endowment to the recipient). “FdS   FdS ! SM” is a
dummy that takes the value 1 if the guesser is FdS, the donor is FdS and the recipient is SM, and the value 0 if the guesser is
FdS, the donor is FdS and the recipient is SX. “Number of SM” is equal to the number of SM in the game session. “Number of
SX” is equal to the number of SX in the game session. “Female” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor is female and
the value 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the donor. “Education” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less
than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed). “Household income” is a categorical variable
that ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “Religiosity” is a categorical variable
that ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious services several times a week). “Knows players from
previous sessions” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor knows players who participated in previous game sessions and
the value 0 otherwise. The sum of the coeﬃcients in rows (2) and (4) stands for the impact on FdS guesses about the amount
given by FdS donors to SM recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SM in
the game session. The coeﬃcient in row (5) stands for the impact on on FdS guesses about the amount given by FdS donors to
SX recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SX in the game session. Standard
errors are clustered at the guesser level. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
36Table 11: Non-FdS generosity toward all ethno-religious types of recipients when SM and SX numbers
increase. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Non-FdS donations to all types of recipients
(1) (2) (3)
(1) non-FdS ! SM -0.794 (0.607) -0.605 (0.717) -0.791 (0.616)
(2) (non-FdS ! SM)*Number of SM 0.107 (0.248) 0.252 (0.346) 0.112 (0.252)
(3) (non-FdS ! SM)*Number of SX 0.377 (0.333) 0.101 (0.437) 0.370 (0.338)
(4) non-FdS ! FdS -0.529 (0.472) -0.447 (0.519) -0.530 (0.476)
(5) (non-FdS ! FdS)*Number of SM 0.131 (0.239) 0.243 (0.233) 0.132 (0.241)
(6) (non-FdS ! FdS)*Number of SX 0.126 (0.273) -0.066 (0.233) 0.126 (0.276)
(7) non-FdS ! NA 0.050 (0.579) 0.321 (0.655) 0.051 (0.585)
(8) (non-FdS ! NA)*Number of SM -0.105 (0.283) -0.263 (0.363) -0.100 (0.287)
(9) (non-FdS ! NA)*Number of SX -0.006 (0.346) 0.054 (0.402) -0.015 (0.351)
(10) Number of SM -0.037 (0.272) -0.008 (0.310) 0.009 (0.241)
(11) Number of SX -0.246 (0.354) -0.004 (0.402) -0.245 (0.351)
(12) Female 0.491** (0.244) 0.354 (0.237)
(13) Age 0.025* (0.013) 0.032** (0.013)
(14) Education 0.112** (0.045) 0.062 (0.047)
(15) Household income -0.015 (0.060) 0.001 (0.057)
(16) Religiosity 0.069 (0.067) 0.058 (0.058)
(17) Knows players from previous sessions -0.291 (0.336) -0.036 (0.275)
Multiple Imputation Analysis No No Yes
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(10)=0 0.72 0.37 0.55
P-value of the Wald test: (3)+(11)=0 0.70 0.80 0.71
P-value of the Wald test: (5)+(10)=0 0.64 0.26 0.41
P-value of the Wald test: (6)+(11)=0 0.70 0.82 0.70
P-value of the Wald test: (8)+(10)=0 0.54 0.28 0.67
P-value of the Wald test: (9)+(11)=0 0.45 0.90 0.44
P-value of the Wald test: (10)=0 0.89 0.98 0.97
P-value of the Wald test: (11)=0 0.49 0.99 0.49
R2 0.010 0.129 0.102
Observations 354 294 354
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed by a non-FdS donor and all of the 4
ethno-religious types of recipients. The dependent variable is categorical. It ranges from 0 (the donor gives nothing to the
recipient) to 5 (the donor gives her total endowment to the recipient). “non-FdS ! SM” is a dummy that takes the value
1 if the donor is non-FdS and the recipient is SM, and 0 otherwise. “non-FdS ! FdS” is a dummy that takes the value 1
if the donor is non-FdS and the recipient is FdS, and 0 otherwise. “non-FdS ! NA” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if
the donor is non-FdS and the recipient is North African, and 0 otherwise. “Number of SM” is equal to the number of SM
in the game session. “Number of SX” is equal to the number of SX in the game session. “Female” is a dummy that takes
the value 1 if the donor is female and the value 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the donor. “Education” is a
categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed).
“Household income” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500
euros monthly). “Religiosity” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends
religious services several times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the
donor knows players who participated in previous game sessions and the value 0 otherwise. The sum of the coeﬃcients in
rows (2) and (10) ((3) and (11)) stands for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to SM recipients when there
are no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SM (SX) in the game session. The sum of the coef-
ﬁcients in rows (5) and (10) ((6) and (11)) stands for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to FdS recipients
when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SM (SX) in the game session. The sum
of the coeﬃcients in rows (8) and (10) ((9) and (11)) stands for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to North
African recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SM (SX) in the game
session. The coeﬃcient in row (10) ((11)) stands for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to SX recipients when
there are no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SM (SX) in the game session. Standard errors
are clustered at the donor level. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
37Table 12: FdS generosity toward SM and SX recipients when SM and SX numbers increase. Robustness
checks.
Dep. var.: FdS donations to SM and SX
(1) (2) (3)
(1) FdS ! SM 2.369* 2.369* 1.984
(1.319) (1.367) (3.373)
(2) (FdS ! SM)*Number of SM -0.970** -0.970** -1.219
(0.427) (0.442) (0.961)
(3) (FdS ! SM)*Number of SX -0.010 -0.010 0.479
(0.936) (0.970) (1.079)
(4) Number of SM -0.067 0.020 -0.513
(0.273) (0.278) (0.521)
(5) Number of SX 1.480** 0.513 0.740
(0.623) (0.681) (1.104)
(6) Female 0.851* 1.825** 1.479
(0.418) (0.656) (0.947)
(7) Age 0.010 0.007 0.003
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
(8) Education 0.151 0.075 0.049
(0.202) (0.184) (0.294)
(9) Household income -0.101 -0.160 -0.154
(0.095) (0.115) (0.129)
(10) Religiosity 0.346 0.286 0.291
(0.301) (0.236) (0.435)
(11) Knows players from previous sessions 0.550 0.567 1.136
(0.894) (1.076) (1.926)
Face ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
Average religiosity of SM and SX No Yes No
Out-group salience of other ethno-religious types No No Yes
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=0 0.01 0.01 0.10
P-value of the Wald test: (5)=0 0.03 0.46 0.51
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=(5) 0.00 0.04 0.06
R2 0.587 0.653 0.686
Observations 42 42 42
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed by a FdS donor and a SM or
SX recipient. The dependent variable is categorical. It ranges from 0 (the donor gives nothing to the recipient)
to 5 (the donor gives her total endowment to the recipient). “FdS ! SM” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if
the donor is FdS and the recipient is SM, and the value 0 if the donor is FdS and the recipient is SX. “Num-
ber of SM” is equal to the number of SM in the game session. “Number of SX” is equal to the number of SX
in the game session. “Female” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor is female and the value 0 other-
wise. “Age” is equal to the age of the donor. “Education” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than
primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed). “Household income” is a categorical
variable that ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “Religios-
ity” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious services
several times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor
knows players who participated in previous game sessions and the value 0 otherwise. The sum of the coeﬃcients
in rows (2) and (4) stands for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to SM recipients when there are
no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SM in the game session. The coeﬃcient in row
(5) stands for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to SX recipients when there are no SM and no
SX donors in the session, of having one additional SX in the game session. In column 1, we reproduce the OLS
estimates of equation (2). In column 2, we control for the average religiosity of SM and SX players in each game
session. In column 3, we control for the eﬀect of the group salience of other ethno-religious types of players.
Standard errors are clustered at the donor level. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
38Table 13: FdS guesses about other FdS generosity toward SM and SX recipients when SM and SX
numbers increase. Robustness checks.
Dep. var.: FdS guesses about FdS donations to SM and SX
(1) (2) (3)
(1) FdS   FdS ! SM 3.447** 3.447* 3.094
(1.632) (1.691) (2.927)
(2) (FdS   FdS ! SM)*Number of SM -0.545 -0.545 -0.687
(0.350) (0.362) (0.683)
(3) (FdS   FdS ! SM)*Number of SX -1.485 -1.485 -0.875
(1.041) (1.079) (1.326)
(4) Number of SM 0.254 0.245 -0.328
(0.298) (0.234) (0.502)
(5) Number of SX 2.780*** 0.920 2.119***
(0.829) (0.767) (0.734)
(6) Female 0.997** 1.841*** 3.006***
(0.362) (0.438) (0.285)
(7) Age -0.008 -0.021* -0.021*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
(8) Education 0.023 -0.203 -0.122
(0.215) (0.156) (0.146)
(9) Household income 0.018 -0.059 -0.087*
(0.086) (0.074) (0.049)
(10) Religiosity 0.352 0.179 0.370**
(0.286) (0.155) (0.139)
(11) Knows players from previous sessions -1.582** -0.266 -1.786***
(0.714) (0.687) (0.567)
Face ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
Average religiosity of SM and SX No Yes No
Out-group salience of other ethno-religious types No No Yes
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=0 0.35 0.22 0.01
P-value of the Wald test: (5)=0 0.00 0.24 0.01
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=(5) 0.00 0.15 0.00
R2 0.563 0.751 0.807
Observations 42 42 42
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a triad formed by a FdS guesser, a FdS donor and a SM or SX
recipient. The dependent variable is categorical. It ranges from 0 (the guesser guesses that the donor gives nothing to the recipient)
to 5 (the guesser guesses that the donor gives her total endowment to the recipient). “FdS   FdS ! SM” is a dummy that takes the
value 1 if the guesser is FdS, the donor is FdS and the recipient is SM, and the value 0 if the guesser is FdS, the donor is FdS and the
recipient is SX. “Number of SM” is equal to the number of SM in the game session. “Number of SX” is equal to the number of SX
in the game session. “Female” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor is female and the value 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to
the age of the donor. “Education” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than
college degree completed). “Household income” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more
than 7,500 euros monthly). “Religiosity” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends
religious services several times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor knows
players who participated in previous game sessions and the value 0 otherwise. The sum of the coeﬃcients in rows (2) and (4) stands
for the impact on FdS guesses about the amount given by FdS donors to SM recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the
session, of having one additional SM in the game session. The coeﬃcient in row (5) stands for the impact on on FdS guesses about the
amount given by FdS donors to SX recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SX in
the game session. In column 1, we reproduce the OLS estimates of equation (3). In column 2, we control for the average religiosity of
SM and SX players in each game session. In column 3, we control for the eﬀect of the group salience of other ethno-religious types of
players. Standard errors are clustered at the guesser level. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
39Table 14: Non-FdS generosity toward all ethno-religious types of recipients when SM and SX numbers
increase. Robustness checks.
Dep. var.: Non-FdS donations to all types of recipients
(1) (2) (3)
(1) non-FdS ! SM -0.791 (0.616) -0.792 (0.618) -0.741 (1.569)
(2) (non-FdS ! SM)*Number of SM 0.112 (0.252) 0.112 (0.253) -0.115 (0.350)
(3) (non-FdS ! SM)*Number of SX 0.370 (0.338) 0.370 (0.339) 0.704 (0.430)
(4) non-FdS ! FdS -0.530 (0.476) -0.530 (0.478) -0.537 (1.528)
(5) (non-FdS ! FdS)*Number of SM 0.132 (0.241) 0.132 (0.242) -0.032 (0.319)
(6) (non-FdS ! FdS)*Number of SX 0.126 (0.276) 0.126 (0.277) 0.403 (0.561)
(7) non-FdS ! NA 0.051 (0.585) 0.051 (0.587) -0.779 (1.781)
(8) (non-FdS ! NA)*Number of SM -0.100 (0.287) -0.099 (0.289) 0.175 (0.372)
(9) (non-FdS ! NA)*Number of SX -0.015 (0.351) -0.015 (0.352) -0.291 (0.664)
(10) Number of SM 0.009 (0.241) -0.001 (0.243) 0.526 (0.474)
(11) Number of SX -0.245 (0.351) 0.254 (0.355) -0.224 (0.519)
(12) Female 0.354 (0.237) -0.201 (0.333) 0.081 (0.373)
(13) Age 0.032** (0.013) 0.034*** (0.012) 0.033*** (0.012)
(14) Education 0.062 (0.047) 0.063 (0.053) 0.049 (0.051)
(15) Household income 0.001 (0.057) -0.004 (0.053) -0.003 (0.055)
(16) Religiosity 0.058 (0.058) 0.060 (0.058) 0.065 (0.060)
(17) Knows players from previous sessions -0.036 (0.275) -0.014 (0.252) -0.055 (0.269)
Multiple Imputation Analysis Yes Yes Yes
Average religiosity of SM and SX No Yes No
Group salience of other ethno-religious types No No Yes
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(10)=0 0.55 0.57 0.32
P-value of the Wald test: (3)+(11)=0 0.71 0.11 0.31
P-value of the Wald test: (5)+(10)=0 0.41 0.41 0.14
P-value of the Wald test: (6)+(11)=0 0.70 0.24 0.60
P-value of the Wald test: (8)+(10)=0 0.67 0.63 0.08
P-value of the Wald test: (9)+(11)=0 0.44 0.48 0.26
P-value of the Wald test: (10)=0 0.97 1.00 0.27
P-value of the Wald test: (11)=0 0.49 0.48 0.67
R2 0.102 0.133 0.156
Observations 354 354 354
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed by a non-FdS donor and all of the 4
ethno-religious types of recipients. The dependent variable is categorical. It ranges from 0 (the donor gives nothing to the
recipient) to 5 (the donor gives her total endowment to the recipient). “non-FdS ! SM” is a dummy that takes the value
1 if the donor is non-FdS and the recipient is SM, and 0 otherwise. “non-FdS ! FdS” is a dummy that takes the value 1
if the donor is non-FdS and the recipient is FdS, and 0 otherwise. “non-FdS ! NA” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if
the donor is non-FdS and the recipient is North African, and 0 otherwise. “Number of SM” is equal to the number of SM in
the game session. “Number of SX” is equal to the number of SX in the game session. “Female” is a dummy that takes the
value 1 if the donor is female and the value 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the donor. “Education” is a categorical
variable that ranges from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed). “Household
income” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly).
“Religiosity” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious services sev-
eral times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor knows players who
participated in previous game sessions and the value 0 otherwise. The sum of the coeﬃcients in rows (2) and (10) ((3) and
(11)) stands for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to SM recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in
the session, of having one additional SM (SX) in the game session. The sum of the coeﬃcients in rows (5) and (10) ((6) and
(11)) stands for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to FdS recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors
in the session, of having one additional SM (SX) in the game session. The sum of the coeﬃcients in rows (8) and (10) ((9)
and (11)) stands for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to North African recipients when there are no SM and
no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SM (SX) in the game session. The coeﬃcient in row (10) ((11)) stands
for the impact on the amount given by FdS donors to SX recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in the session,
of having one additional SM (SX) in the game session. In column 1, we reproduce the OLS estimates of equation (5). In
column 2, we control for the average religiosity of SM and SX players in each game session. In column 3, we control for the
eﬀect of the group salience of other ethno-religious types of players. Standard errors are clustered at the donor level. *, **
and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
40Appendix
Table A1: SM and SX generosity toward their in-group when SM and SX numbers increase. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: SM and SX donations to their in-group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) SM donor ! SM recipient 0.711 -0.271 -1.189 -2.065
(1.367) (2.642) (4.129) (3.011)
(2) (SM donor ! SM recipient)*Number of SM -0.740 -0.733 -0.846 -0.195
(0.534) (0.538) (1.229) (0.657)
(3) (SM donor ! SM recipient)*Number of SX -0.328 0.383 0.892 0.694
(0.690) (1.701) (2.512) (1.940)
(4) Number of SM 0.290 0.268 0.381 -0.077
(0.463) (0.472) (1.141) (0.532)
(5) Number of SX -0.355 -0.707 -1.006 -0.729
(0.568) (1.072) (2.089) (1.247)
(6) Female 0.131 0.152
(0.504) (0.383)
(7) Age 0.000 0.002
(0.033) (0.021)
(8) Education 0.030 0.059
(0.158) (0.072)
(9) Household income -0.052 -0.052
(0.108) (0.081)
(10) Religiosity -0.087 -0.085
(0.250) (0.146)
(11) Knows players from previous sessions 0.377 0.516
(0.900) (0.460)
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=0 0.10 0.07 0.22 0.38
P-value of the Wald test: (5)=0 0.54 0.52 0.64 0.56
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=(5) 0.88 0.83 0.80 0.72
Face ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes Yes
Multiple Imputation Analysis No No No Yes
R2 0.512 0.527 0.581 0.600
Observations 27 27 21 27
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed by a SM donor and a SM recipient or
a SX donor and a SX recipient. The dependent variable is categorical. It ranges from 0 (the donor gives nothing to the
recipient) to 5 (the donor gives her total endowment to the recipient). “SM ! SM” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if
the donor is SM and the recipient is SM, and the value 0 if the donor is SX and the recipient is SX. “Number of SM” is
equal to the number of SM in the game session. “Number of SX” is equal to the number of SX in the game session. “Fe-
male” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor is female and the value 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the
donor. “Education” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than
college degree completed). “Household income” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly)
to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “Religiosity” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (never attends religious
services) to 7 (attends religious services several times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions” is a dummy that
takes the value 1 if the donor knows players who participated in previous game sessions and the value 0 otherwise. The
sum of the coeﬃcients in rows (2) and (4) stands for the impact on the amount given by SM donors to SM recipients when
there are no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SM in the game session. The coeﬃcient in row
(5) stands for the impact on the amount given by SX donors to SX recipients when there are no SM and no SX donors in
the session, of having one additional SX in the game session. Standard errors are clustered at the donor level. *, ** and
*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
41Table A2: SM and SX generosity toward FdS recipients when SM and SX numbers increase. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: SM and SX donations to FdS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) SM donor ! FdS recipient -1.422 -1.360 -3.696*** -2.749**
(1.197) (1.108) (1.232) (1.279)
(2) (SM donor ! FdS recipient)*Number of SM -0.475 -0.506 0.388 -0.152
(0.388) (0.367) (0.587) (0.503)
(3) (SM donor ! FdS recipient)*Number of SX 1.025 1.030* 1.384 1.301**
(0.612) (0.563) (0.931) (0.602)
(4) Number of SM 0.457** 0.475*** 0.208 0.245
(0.192) (0.170) (0.491) (0.267)
(5) Number of SX -0.855* -0.562 -0.776 -0.678
(0.486) (0.474) (1.034) (0.483)
(6) Female 0.423* 0.443*
(0.223) (0.235)
(7) Age -0.032* -0.006
(0.017) (0.016)
(8) Education 0.059 0.008
(0.075) (0.061)
(9) Household income -0.087 -0.040
(0.067) (0.052)
(10) Religiosity 0.008 -0.107
(0.121) (0.100)
(11) Knows players from previous sessions 0.395 0.478
(0.450) (0.371)
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=0 0.96 0.92 0.09 0.77
P-value of the Wald test: (5)=0 0.09 0.25 0.46 0.17
P-value of the Wald test: (2)+(4)=(5) 0.17 0.37 0.23 0.17
Face ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes Yes
Multiple Imputation Analysis No No No Yes
R2 0.218 0.294 0.411 0.384
Observations 81 81 63 81
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed by a SM donor and a FdS
recipient or a SX donor and a FdS recipient. The dependent variable is categorical. It ranges from 0 (the donor
gives nothing to the recipient) to 5 (the donor gives her total endowment to the recipient). “SM ! FdS” is a
dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor is SM and the recipient is FdS, and the value 0 if the donor is SX and
the recipient is FdS. “Number of SM” is equal to the number of SM in the game session. “Number of SX” is equal
to the number of SX in the game session. “Female” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor is female and
the value 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the donor. “Education” is a categorical variable that ranges
from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed). “Household income”
is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly).
“Religiosity” is a categorical variable that ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious
services several times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions” is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the
donor knows players who participated in previous game sessions and the value 0 otherwise. The sum of the coeﬃ-
cients in rows (2) and (4) stands for the impact on the amount given by SM donors to FdS recipients when there
are no SM and no SX donors in the session, of having one additional SM in the game session. The coeﬃcient in
row (5) stands for the impact on the amount given by SX donors to FdS recipients when there are no SM and no
SX donors in the session, of having one additional SX in the game session. Standard errors are clustered at the
donor level. *, ** and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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